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Abstract
Wireless body area networks (WBANs) are formed by using tiny health monitoring sensors on the human body in order
to collect and communicate the human personal data. WBANs serve as a solution to facilitate the tasks performed in
the medical sector, and minimize the chances of errors during the process of medical diagnosis. Due to the unreliable
wireless media, the communication in a WBAN is exposed to a variety of attacks. These attacks pose major threats to
WBAN security. In order to overcome these threats, several cryptographic techniques have been proposed in the
recent past. Effectiveness of these cryptographic techniques largely depends on a good key management scheme.
However, using an expensive key management scheme is not feasible in highly resource-constrained WBANs.
Therefore, we propose and evaluate an energy-efficient key management scheme for WBANs that takes into account
available resources of a node during the whole life cycle of key management. Our proposed scheme is a cluster-based
hybrid security framework that supports both intra-WBAN and inter-WBAN communications. By using multiple
clusters, energy-efficiency can be ensured. The cluster formation process itself is secured by using electrocardiogram
(EKG)-based key agreement scheme. The proposed technique is hybrid because we use both preloading of keys and
physiological value-based generated keys. We use highly dynamic and random EKG values of the human body for
pairwise key generation and refreshment. The performance comparison of our proposed cluster-based key
management scheme and low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH)-based key agreement scheme shows
that the proposed scheme is secure, more energy-efficient, and provides better network lifetime.
Keywords: Wireless body area networks (WBANs); Energy-efficiency; Key management; Clustering
1 Introduction
Wireless body area network (WBAN) is a special kind of
network, which is formed by putting the biometric sen-
sors on the human body. In other words, a human body
wearing the biometric sensor clothes forms the WBAN
[1]. Due to resource limitations, WBANs need a num-
ber of sensor nodes to collect physiological data from
the body of its wearer in a safe and secure manner. Each
WBAN also contains a single centralized entity called
personal server (PS), which gathers data from the sen-
sor nodes using multi-hop communication. The PS acts
as a gateway between the body on which it resides and
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the outside world. There are two types of communica-
tions inWBANs; intra-WBAN communication, and inter-
WBAN communication. The on-body communication
among the sensor nodes is called intra-WBAN communi-
cation. Inter-WBAN communication occurs between PSs
residing on two or more bodies, i.e., WBANs.
The applications of WBANs include the monitoring of
human health remotely. In this type of application, the
health monitoring sensors are implanted on the human
body. These sensors collect personal data from the host
body and send it to remote medical servers located in
the hospital. Similarly, inter-WBAN communication can
be applied to the health monitoring system, for example,
monitoring the health of patients while they are doing
their normal routine work (i.e., somewhere in market,
home, office, or even in the playground). In this case,
WBANs (sensor-clothed bodies) will be scattered and
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the sink or remote base station (RBS) will not always be
in their range. Therefore, WBANs must cooperate with
one another using hop-by-hop communication in order
to reach the RBS (sink), and the RBS further communi-
cates with the medical server (MS) through the internet.
Another application scenario of inter-WBAN communi-
cation could be monitoring the health of soldiers in a
battlefield. After deployment, nodes that are far away from
the RBS, located in a safe zone, will have to communi-
cate in a hop-by-hop fashion in order to reach the RBS.
In this scenario, the nodes (WBANs) act as routers to for-
ward data to the RBS. In both the applications, theWBAN
(single human body) may not always be in the range of
the remote MS or the RBS. So, along with intra-WBAN
communication, there is a need for inter-WBAN com-
munication in order to deliver data to the destination,
i.e., through PS to MS. Securing intra-WBAN and inter-
WBAN communications means securing the human lives
because both kinds of communications involve the human
personal data to be delivered to the medical server. Hence,
the security of WBANs is essential.
WBANs are composed of small sensors that have
limited memory and power sources. For such a spe-
cial network, security, energy, and other requirements
differ from ordinary wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
The security protocols designed for WSNs cannot be
applied to WBANs due to their energy and storage
constraints. Moreover, the key management protocols
for WSNs will not work as efficiently as the proto-
cols specifically designed for WBANs [2,3], e.g., public
key-based protocols will be computationally expensive
to use in WBANs [4]. There are some symmetric key
management strategies for secure trust establishment
in WSNs, e.g., pre-deployment-based key management,
communication-based key management, and public key-
based key management schemes. Each of these schemes
has its own limitations, e.g., limited memory, authenti-
cation from a centralized authority, and complex math-
ematics [5]. Table 1 summarizes the differences between
WBANs and WSNs.
In this paper, we propose a secure cluster-based key
management scheme for both intra-WBAN and inter-
WBAN communications. In intra-WBAN communica-
tion, we use physiological value (PV)-based solution for
establishing trust among sensor nodes. PV is a stimulus
from human body, which is used for generating pairwise
keys. The advantage of PV-based solution is that the gen-
erated keys on both sender and receiver sides are the same,
because both the sender and the receiver use the same PVs
for generating the key. We use electrocardiogram (EKG)
as a PV to generate pairwise keys in intra-WBAN com-
munication, which eliminates the key distribution process
[5,8-10]. Due to the highly dynamic nature of the human
body, it produces time-variant PV, i.e., EKG, which results
in addition and removal of nodes without rekeying [11].
In intra-WBAN communication, the cluster formation is
done on the basis of residual energy and distance [12]. The
leader solicitations are made secure to avoid sinkhole-like
attacks by using secure cluster formation using EKG-
based keys. For secure cluster formation and exchange of
EKG blocks in intra-WBAN communication, we use EKG-
based generated pairwise keys using keyed-hashing digest.
Keyed-hashing message authentication code (HMAC-
MD5) [13] ensures the authenticity and integrity of the
EKG blocks exchange process between communicating
sensors in intra-WBAN communication. Securing com-
munication among the sensors is done in two steps. In
the first step, trust is established between the sensors, and
in the second step, data communication is carried out on
the basis of that trust. Trust establishment is the process
of agreeing upon a common key for secure communica-
tion [14]. While in inter-WBAN communication, secure
cluster formation and communication is done through
preloaded pool of keys. The reason of using preloading-
based keys is that existing PV based key management
schemes of WBANs are designed by keeping in mind the
characteristics of intra-WBAN communication, i.e., these
networks are small in size and scale, and the commu-
nication is done over a single body. Whereas, in inter-
WBAN communication, the communication involves two
or more bodies (WBANs), therefore, EKG-based scheme
cannot be applied in this case. Moreover, in inter-WBAN
communication, the security requirements are totally dif-
ferent from those of intra-WBAN communication e.g.,
there is an additional risk of physical attacks in inter-
WBAN communication such as node capture, tampering,
as well as unknown pre-deployment network topology
etc.
An important requirement of inter-WBAN communi-
cation is the efficiency of energy, which increases the
lifetime of a network. For this purpose, we use an energy-
efficient secure cluster formation technique in inter-
WBAN communication. The PS acts as a single node and
represents the wholeWBAN in inter-WBAN communica-
tion. To communicate multiple WBANs, only the PS will
communicate with another PS and will choose one PS as
a cluster head (CH). For example, consider three WBANs
A, B, and C having personal servers PS1, PS2, and PS3,
respectively. Now if A wants to communicate with B or
C, it will communicate through PS1 to PS2 or PS3 and
the ordinary sensor nodes on A, B, and C will not take
part in inter-WBAN communication. Our technique for
clustering in inter-WBAN communication is based on the
residual energy of the PS and the distance between PSs
of two communicating WBANs. We use a pool of keys
and then randomly select some keys from that pool. These
randomly selected keys from CH are assigned to cluster
members (CMs) in the pre-deployment phase.
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Table 1 Difference betweenWBANs andWSNs [6,7]
Challenges Wireless sensor network Wireless body area network
Scale Monitored environment (meters/kilometers) Human body (centimeters/meters)
Number of nodes Many redundant nodes for wide area coverage Fewer, limited in space
Result accuracy Large number of nodes provide accuracy Few nodes, need to be robust and
accurate
Node tasks Node performs a dedicated task Node performs multiple tasks
Node size Small is preferred, but not important Small is essential
Network topology Very likely to be fixed or static More variable due to body movement
Data rates Most often homogeneous Most often heterogeneous
Node replacement Performed easily, nodes are even disposable Replacement of implanted nodes is
difficult
Node lifetime Several years or months Several years or months, smaller battery
capacity
Power supply Accessible and can be replaced easily and frequently Inaccessible and difficult to replace in an
implantable setting
Power demand Likely to be large, energy supply easier Likely to be lower, energy supply more
difficult
Energy scavenging source Most likely solar and wind power Most likely motion (vibration) and
thermal (body heat)
Biocompatibility Not a consideration in most applications A must for implants and some external
sensors
Security level Lower Higher to protect personal information
Impact of data loss Likely to be compensated by redundant nodes More significant, may require additional
measures to ensure QoS and real-time
data delivery
Wireless technology Bluetooth, ZigBee, GPRS, WLAN, etc. Low power technology required
Key management support from application No Yes, sensor nodes not required to
generate random numbers
Human intervention Not possible in most cases Possible rather inevitable in some cases
The main contributions of our work are summarized
as follows: (1) We propose a cluster-based key man-
agement technique for intra-WBAN communication that
uses PV-based (EKG) generated keys for secure clus-
ter formation. (2) For inter-WBAN communication, the
clustering is made secure by using the preloading-based
lightweight key management scheme [15] that is divided
into two phases. The first phase includes the communi-
cation between WBANs and the second phase includes
the communication betweenWBAN and RBS. During the
communication between WBAN and RBS, the WBAN
might not be in the transmission range of the RBS. In this
case the WBAN will communicate with another WBAN
(WBAN-to-WBAN communication) to reach the RBS. (3)
We also present a key refreshment mechanism for both
intra-WBAN and inter-WBAN communications based on
PVs. After presenting our scheme, its overhead is analyzed
based on storage, energy, and security. (4) We compare
our proposed secure cluster formation technique with the
technique presented in [5]. The authors in [5] use PV-
based security scheme in a WBAN, where low-energy
adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) [16] is used for
secure cluster formation. Table 2 shows a list of notations
used in the paper.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2 the related work is explained. Section 3
presents the system model, while Section 4 describes
our intra-WBAN communication security technique. In
Section 5 the technique for inter-WBAN communication
is explained. Section 6 presents the performance evalua-
tion of our proposed technique, and Section 7 concludes
the article.
2 Related work
Clinical prototypes for implantable and wearable health
monitoring sensors have been designed recently. These
devices are used for monitoring human body over long
periods of time [17,18]. Most of the work concerns bio-
compatibility, power-efficiency, and reliability. Therefore,
ensuring the security of communication among these
devices is important [19,20]. Medical sensors used in a
pervasive healthcare system have very limited capabilities.
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Table 2 Notations used in the paper
Symbol/notation Description Symbol/notation Description
WBAN Wireless body area network Ksk Secret key preloaded in all sensors
WSN Wireless sensor network MAC Message authentication code
EKG Electrocardiogram is the interpreta-
tion of the electrical activity of the
heart for a specific period
Kn and Kn′ Kn is the key selected from the key
pool, and Kn′ is the hashed key
obtained as a result of the hash of
Kn
PV Physiological value is a biological
characteristic of the body
EK SNa ,SNb Pairwise key established between
SNa and SNb
IDSNa ,IDSNb , IDps, IDSNs Identifiers of sensor nodes a, b,
personal server, and network
respectively
nonce Random number generated during
the communication process to
check the transaction freshness
MS Medical server located in hospital KeyRef Broadcast message used to refresh
key in the network
RBS Remote base station P Key pool
CH Cluster head S Subset of P
CM Cluster member R Key ring
Intra-WBAN communication The on-body communication Ki Randomly selected key from the
pool
Inter-WBAN communication The communication between two
or more WBANs
HMAC Keyed-hashing for message
authentication
SNa Sensor node ‘a’ KM Master key
SNb Sensor node ‘b’ Ki′ Hashed key
PS Personal server ICK Integrity check key
Ere Residual energy Knet Network key for broadcast
authentication
T(n) The number of competing nodes Pr Probabilities of occurrence of CH
E0 Initial energy d Distance from RBS
Hence, in general, a complex, computationally inten-
sive security mechanism such as public-key infrastructure
[21,22] is not suitable for securing medical sensor com-
munication in the context of pervasive healthcare. Simi-
larly, authors in [23,24] present the pre-deployment-based
strategy to protect the communication in distributed sen-
sor networks. Techniques such as message-in-a-bottle
[25] are also not suitable for WBANs as they involve
the use of a Faraday cage, which increases the involve-
ment of the host, i.e., the host will put the Faraday cage
in the WBAN. A technique concerning the security of
implantable devices is presented in [26], which describes
the use of biometrics as a tool for generating crypto-
graphic keys for secure inter-sensor communication. Due
to the extremely dynamic properties of human body, it
can produce many specific physiological values that are
time-variant and difficult to guess. These time-variant
properties for cryptographic purposes ensure strong secu-
rity and eliminate key distribution [5,8-10]. Both sender
and receiver can now measure the physiological val-
ues from their environment, generate pairwise keys, and
use them for security purposes whenever they intend to
communicate [26].
In [9,10] the authors use EKG as a physiological measure
for generating cryptographic keys for secure inter-sensor
communication. Both communicating sensors first sense
the EKG values and then by applying certain hashing
and watermarking technique, exchange these values for
generating common keys for communication. In [27,28]
the authors proposed a pairwise key management pro-
tocol which uses accelerometer (handheld device) data
as a PV for generating the keys. The scheme works
by physically shaking the communicating devices. After
shaking the user has to press ‘authenticate now’ but-
ton to synchronize the accelerometer signal measurement
process and execute the protocol. In [6] the authors pro-
pose a preloading-based scheme for key management
in WBANs; however, the technique suffers from lack
of variations. Key refreshment is also an issue with the
preloading-based schemes. Also, most of the preloading-
based schemes suffer from forward secrecy problems. In
[29] the authors use PV-based keys for secure cluster for-
mation. The idea of cluster-based secure key agreement
protocol for WBANs is presented in [8]. The authors
consider the WBAN as a single cluster and the PS is
considered as the CH. The network is assumed to be a
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heterogeneous WSN, which consists of a powerful high-
end sensor (H-sensor) node and several low-end sensor
(L-sensors) nodes.
Several techniques are available in the literature for
selecting CH in a cluster. In [30] CH is chosen on the
basis of node ID. In [31] a cluster-based protocol uses ran-
domized rotation of local CHs to evenly distribute the
energy load among sensors in the network. In [32] optimal
CH selection is done using multi-objective particle swarm
optimization. The above approaches do not consider secu-
rity of the protocols or techniques that are used for cluster
formation. Also in the context of WBANs, the above-
mentioned techniques are very complex and expensive
due to limited resources of the nodes in WBANs. In [33]
the authors propose a secure cluster formation scheme,
which is based on microTesla protocol. MicroTesla pro-
tocol uses pre-deployment and public-key cryptography
which is expensive in WBANs. The scheme proposed in
this paper presents a secure cluster-based approach to
choose an optimal CH on the basis of residual energy and
distance of nodes present in WBANs.
3 Systemmodel
We assume the WBAN as a network of sensor nodes
implanted on the human body, with the ability to measure
PVs of the body. We also assume that the sensors have the
capability of measuring multiple types of PVs. Physiologi-
cal monitoring sensors aremostlymultimodal and are able
to sense multiple types of stimuli [34,35]. Sensor nodes
are ordinary devices with limited computation, communi-
cation, and storage capabilities. We consider that sensor
nodes have different communication and storage pow-
ers and all the nodes are constrained in energy. PS is
a powerful sensor node having high computation, com-
munication, energy supply, and storage capabilities. The
PS is preloaded with node identities and relevant keys
before deployment. The proposed system architecture for
intra-WBAN communication is shown in Figure 1.
Inter-WBAN communication involves CHs and CMs
communication. CMs are PSs located on the body in
WBANs to collect information or biometrics from sen-
sors and then transmit to CHs. PSs are body base sta-
tions, which are more powerful devices attached to the
human body. CHs are tamper-resistant devices that are
well-protected against routing attacks and adversaries.
The proposed technique uses residual energy and dis-
tance [12] to choose the CHs for inter-WBAN as well
as intra-WBAN communication using Equation 2. The
residual energy and distance of each node in intra-WBAN
communication is checked. If a node has an optimal value
returned from the equation, it is selected as CH and the
nodes within its transmission range are considered as its
cluster members. Similarly, a PS on a body (WBAN) is
selected as CH based on residual energy and distance in
case of inter-WBAN communication by using the same
equation. Figure 2 shows the architecture for inter-WBAN
communication.
4 Intra-WBAN communication
The proposed technique uses EKG-based generated keys
for secure cluster formation in intra-WBAN communica-
tion (Figure 3). Pairwise keys are used for key manage-
ment, and a unique key is used for each communication
between the sensor nodes. The IDs of nodes and the secret
key KSK are preloaded in all the sensors.
EKG values are used for the generation of keys. When
SNa wishes to communicate with SNb, SNa sends hello
message with its ID in message 1.
m1 : ∀SNaε {SN} : SNa → SNb : MAC(IDSNa , Hello, nonce)
After receivingm1, SNb calculates pairwise key with the
required data and ID of SNa and SNb
KSNa,SNb = HMAC(Calculated EKG value ‖ IDSNa ‖ IDSNb)
(1)
SNb encrypts the data with KSNa,SNb and computes the
message authentication code (MAC) on ID of SNa, nonce
from SNa, and data using the same key KSNa,SNb . In m2,
SNb sends its ID, encrypted data and MAC to SNa.
m2 : ∀SNb → SNa : IDSNb , EKSNa,Snb{IDSNb , Data},
MACKSNa,SNb (IDSNb , Data, nonce)
When PS receives thism2, first it calculates the KSNa,SNb
by applying the keyed-hash function on the calculated
EKG values, IDSNa and IDSNb . As EKG values are same on
both sides, KSNa,SNb generated by SNa will also be same
as that of SNb. SNa decrypts the message with KSNa,SNb
and compares IDSNb and received EKG values with the
decrypted message IDSNb and EKG values on SNa to
ensure that both parties have generated the same key. The
message authenticity is checked by SNa through MAC
verification with KSNa,SNb . The communication between
PS and sensor nodes is done through the IDPS. PS broad-
casts its ID to the whole network. Sensor nodes generate
KPS,SN by applying keyed-hash function on IDSN, IDPS,
and EKG values. SN encrypts data by KPS,SN and sends its
ID, encrypted data, and MAC of these values to PS. PS
then generates the key and decrypts the data. Authentica-
tion of PS is done by MAC.
4.1 Secure cluster formation in intra-WBAN
communication
In this step the nodes with minimum energy and located
far from PS are organized in a cluster to reduce the energy
dissipation during the communication. The cluster forma-
tion process is based on the parameters of residual energy
and distance from PS. The following equation is derived
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Figure 1 Intra-WBAN communication architecture.
from the formula presented in [36], in which the node with
optimal value of T(n) is selected as CH:
T(n) = Ere.PrE0.d (2)
where T(n) represents the total number of competing
nodes, Ere and E0 are the residual and initial energies
respectively, d is the distance while Pr is the probability of
occurrence of the CH. The traditional cluster formation
protocols can allow a malicious node to broadcast a false
solicitation beacon claiming itself as a CH by advertis-
ing wrong residual energy and distance. When CM nodes
receive this message, they consider the claiming node as
their CH. This type of attack is called HELLO Flood attack
[37]. The malicious node can easily launch sinkhole attack
using HELLO Flood and claiming itself as CH. When a
sinkhole is formed, all the information passing through
it can easily be manipulated by the malicious node. In
response, a malicious CM sends a join request to the CH
and joins the network by claiming itself as a legitimate
CM. In this case, the malicious CM can also manipu-
late and inject false data and alarms in the network. In
intra-WBAN communication, the security is provided by
computing the MAC. Every CH broadcasts its solicitation
message by including a certificate in order to authenticate
the CHs. When the CMs receive this message, they ver-
ify the certificate by using MAC. In the proposed scheme,
the certificates are issued by the PS of the WBAN. For
example, when CHa wants to authenticate other nodes
in the cluster formation process in intra-WBAN com-
munication, CHa will broadcast a message containing
its certificate (CERTCHa) and will be of the following
format:
CERTCHa = EKCHa[ IDCHa ||Data||Tsign||Texpire]
where Tsign and Texpire are issuance and expiry time for
the certificate respectively. Also, Data contains the infor-
mation of the node’s residual energy and distance from
PS of the WBAN. Upon receiving this message, every
node in the WBAN verifies the certificate by using MAC.
For renewal of the certificate, the Tref is used and all
certificates must be renewed within this Tref time interval.
Nonce is a random number included in the request
messages, as in Equation 3, to fix the replay problems.
The replies to these request messages must carry the
transformation of this number; otherwise, these are con-
sidered a replay attack. In the proposed work, nonces are
included in the messages exchanged for key agreement,
key refreshment, and node addition/revocation, etc., and
only legitimate users can extract the nonce values from
the MAC and hence protect the replay attack. For exam-
ple, the message exchanged between the sensor nodes
SNa and SNb contains the nonce in the MAC secured
with key KSNa,SNb . Now node SNa having this key will be
able to extract the nonce and can transform this nonce
in the reply message; otherwise, it will be considered as a
replay attack.
∀SNb → SNa : IDSNb , EKSNa,Snb{IDSNb , Data},
MACKSNa,SNb (IDSNb , Data, nonce) (3)
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Figure 2 Inter-WBAN communication architecture.
4.2 Key refreshment in intra-WBAN communication
The keys are refreshed at regular intervals by using the
plug-and-play nature of EKG-based key generation pro-
cess. Due to the dynamic and highly random nature of
EKG values of the human body, the key distribution pro-
cess is eliminated because the generated keys are common
on both the sender and the receiver sides [5,8-10], which
makes the key refreshment process more powerful and
robust. Key refreshment is also very important to main-
tain forward secrecy. Schemes that do not consider key
refreshment suffer from forward secrecy problem [38].
To maintain this property, keys must be refreshed at reg-
ular intervals. Keys in intra-WBAN communication are
refreshed at regular intervals. When PS wishes to refresh
the key, it sends KeyRef message to the sensor nodes.
Sensor nodes compute new key by the EKG values:
m1 : PS → ∗ : KeyRef(IDPS)
5 Inter-WBAN communication
The inter-WBAN communication is used for the deliv-
ery of data from PS to the remote sink. We consider the
inter-WBAN communication as a hierarchical structure,
in which more powerful sensors act as CH. The hierarchi-
cal structure has the advantage of local data processing,
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Figure 3 Cluster formation.
which reduces communication load in the network in
order to provide a scalable solution.
5.1 Key pre-distribution
A key pool P is generated consisting of S number of ran-
dom symmetric keys. These keys and IDs are stored in
a CH. CH are high-end nodes with more storage and
energy capabilities and have tamper-resistant hardware.
The upper limit of S depends upon the storage and com-
putational capabilities of the CH. As CHs are powerful
nodes with high computational, communication, energy
supply, and storage capabilities, the value of S is assumed
to be a large number. Each key is assigned a unique ID.
Further, a unique ID is assigned to each PS [15]. Before
deploying the WBANs, each WBAN is loaded with its
assigned key ring R. The assigning rules are as follows:
Step 1. For each PS, randomly select one key ki from the
key pool and generate a new key k−i by applying
one-way hash function on the PSID and ki. This
newly generated key (k−i ) is assigned the same
key ID as that of ki. Put k−i along with
corresponding key ID into PS’s memory.
Step 2. Each CH is preloaded with all S keys of the key
pool. Further, RBS and each CH are loaded with a
special key KM known as the master key.
5.2 Secure cluster formation in inter-WBAN
communication
Traditional cluster formation protocols are vulnerable to
attacks. The protocols work by choosing the CH after
the deployment of nodes [39,40]. In inter-WBAN com-
munication, the clusters are formed to efficiently deliver
data to the remote sink. The proposed work chooses the
CH on the basis of residual energy and distance from the
RBS [12]. Each node calculates its position by using any
technique such as positioning through global positioning
system (GPS) or any of the GPS-free positioning tech-
niques available in the literature [41-43]. Each node in the
network broadcast its residual energy and distance. Nodes
with optimal value of T(n) in Equation 2 are selected
as CHs. The CH selection process is shown in Figure 4,
where CH selection in cluster B is done by measuring
its distance from the RBS directly. Node 1 in cluster B
is selected as a CH because it has the minimum dis-
tance from the remote base station and also has maximum
residual energy as compared to the other members in the
same transmission range. Similarly, node 4 in cluster A is
selected as CH because its distance from the RBS is lesser
and its residual energy is maximum within that transmis-
sion area. The distance between the sender node and the
RBS will be the total cost of the path (summation of all
distances on the path to RBS). After the CH is selected,
the nodes within its transmission range with minimum
distance from the CH are declared as CM for that partic-
ular CH. The cluster formation process is as follows:
• Each CH broadcast its solicitation beacon, which
contains its ID and control information.
• Upon receiving the solicitation beacon, each CM
decides to join the cluster of a CH such that the
distance of the CM from this CH is minimum as
compared to the distances from other CHs.
• Each CM now sends a join request to the CH whose
cluster it wants to join.
5.3 Neighborhood discovery in inter-WBAN
communication
After the completion of cluster formation, all the WBANs
broadcast solicitation beacons in order to discover their
neighbors in a cluster.
5.4 Inter-cluster and intra-cluster pairwise keys
generation in inter-WBAN communication
After discovering its neighbors, each PS sends m1 to CH
containing PS’s ID, IDs of generated keys (kn′), nonce, and
list of its neighbor WBANs.
m1 : ∀CHa ∈ {CH}∀PSi ∈ {PS} : PSi → CHa : IDPSi ,
IDkn′ , List (neighbors), NoncePSi
CH locates the corresponding key ID (IDkn′ ) from its key
pool S. After locating the key, CHa performs one-way hash
function on the ID of PSi and Kn.
kn′ = fkn(IDPSi) (4)
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Figure 4 Cluster head selection process in inter-WBAN communication.
Network key (Knet) and integrity check key (ICK) is gen-
erated by CHa by applying one-way hash function on ID of
PSi, ID of CHa, nonce of PSi, nonce of CH, and an integer
(0 for ICK, 1 for Knet) using kn′.
ICKPSi,CHa = fkn′(IDPSi , IDCHa , noncePSi , nonceCHa , 0)
(5)
KnetPSi ,CHa = fkn′(IDPSi , IDCHa , noncePSi , nonceCHa , 1) (6)
CHa sends its nonce and MAC calculated on ICK to PSi
so that PSi can generate both keys, ICK, and Knet.
m2 : ∀PSi ∈ {PS} : CHa → PSi : nonceCHa ,
MAC(ICKPSi,CHa , nonceCHa)
After receiving m2 from CHa, PSi generates both ICK
and Knet by extracting nonceCHa. PSi then authenticates
these keys by checking the MAC value. Once MAC is
authenticated, PSi sends ready message to tell CHa that it
is ready to start using the new keys for encryption inm3.
m3 : ∀PSi ∈ {PS} : PSi → CHa : ReadyMsg,
MAC(ICKPSi,CHa , ReadyMsg)
m3 includes a MAC so the CHa can authenticate PSi by
verifying that it has a matching key kn′. CH replies with
m4. PSi waits form4 before installing the keys.
m4 : ∀PSi ∈ {PS} : CHa → PSi : AckMsg,
MAC(ICKPSi,CHa , AckMsg)
Once the message transfer is completed, both CHa and
PSi install the keys and start encryption. After encryp-
tion is enabled and the keys are authenticated, CHa sends
pairwise keys to PSi encrypting with network key Knet in
m5.
m5 : ∀PSi ∈{PS} :CHa→PSi : EKnetPSi ,CHa{KPSi ,PSj ,KPSi ,PSk , . . .}
MAC(ICKPSi ,CHa,KPSi ,PSj ,KPSi ,PSk , . . .)
An inter-cluster communication between CHs is
achieved through keys KCHi and KCHj generated by apply-
ing one-way function on IDCHi and IDCHj using key KM.
All data from CH to RBS are transferred through the
master key KM as given below:
KCHi,KCHj = fKM (IDCHi , IDCHj) (7)
5.5 Re-clustering
In both types of communications, the CH performs long-
distance communication and also performs some extra
tasks due to which its energy reduces with higher ratios
as compared to the CM nodes. Due to this issue, the clus-
ter has to be reorganized at regular intervals by choosing
CHs fromCMnodes. Re-clustering will also be performed
when a node is reconfigured as well as when the CH leaves
especially in inter-WBAN communication.
5.6 WBAN addition
In inter-WBAN communication, in order to add a new PS,
say PSu to the cluster, e.g. clusteri, the RBS assigns a new
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ID to the PSu and a unique master key KM. The PSu then
generates a random nonce RNu and sends the following
message to its cluster head CHi.
m1 : PSu → CHj : (IDPSu , RNu) ‖ MACKM(IDPSu ‖ RNu)
The cluster head CHi simply forwards the receivedmes-
sage from PSu to its neighbor cluster head, if required.
This message finally reaches the remote RBS via cluster
heads.
m2 : CHj → BS : (IDPSu , RNu) ‖ MACKM(IDPSu ‖ RNu)
The authentication of the new PS is done by using the
RBS. The RBS validates the received message and com-
putes the MAC on IDPSu ‖ RNu using the master key
KM. The RBS has the master keys of all sensor nodes. If
computedMACmatches with the corresponding received
MAC, the node PSu is considered as a legitimate node.
5.7 WBAN eviction in inter-WBAN communication
PS eviction means that any PS in the cluster leaves its
region for any reason (power consumption, node emi-
gration, node capture, etc.). In this case, we propose two
cases for PS eviction.
Case 1. Member PS eviction occurs when the CH does
not receive the solicitation beacon from a certain PS for a
specific duration. In this case, CH sends a query message
to that PS and waits for a reply. If it does not receive a
reply within a certain time, the CH sends a message to its
entire member WBANs to inform them to delete the PS
with a certain ID from the list of neighbors.
Case 2. In CH eviction when a CH leaves the cluster,
two steps must be taken. First, the CH sends messages to
its entire members to inform them that it is going to leave.
Another PS is selected as CH by using the Equation 2.
Secondly, if the CH leaves surreptitiously, the entire clus-
ter members will not receive the CH beacon for a certain
period, and then another PS is selected as CH by the same
Equation 2.
5.8 Key refreshment in inter-WBAN communication
Key refreshment in inter-WBAN communication is done
in two phases. The first phase includes intra-cluster key
refreshment and the second phase includes inter-cluster
key refreshment. For intra-cluster key refreshment, CHa
randomly selects one ID from the assigned key ring of PSi
and sends its own ID and selected ID to PSi.
m1 : ∀CHa ∈{CH}∀PSi ∈ {PS} : CHi → PSa : IDCHi , IDkn
After receiving ID from CHa, PSi locates the corre-
sponding key of that ID and generates new key K ′n by
applying one-way hash function on the ID of CHa and Kn.
Kn′ = fkn(IDCHa) (8)
ICK and Knet are refreshed by CHa by applying one-way
hash function on newly generated key Kn′, ID of PSi, ID
of CHa, nonce of PSi, and nonce of CHa, (0 for ICK, 1 for
Knet).
ICKPSi,CHa = fkn′(IDPSi,CHa , noncePSi , nonceCHa , 0) (9)
KnetPSi,CHa = fkn′(IDPSi,CHa , noncePSi , nonceCHa , 1) (10)
CHa sends the nonceCHa and MAC calculated by newly
generated ICK, so that PSi can refresh ICK and network
key Knet.
m2 : ∀PSi ∈ {PS} : CHa → PSi : nonceCHa ,
MAC(ICKPSi,CHa , nonceCHa)
After receiving m2, PSi generates ICK and Knet by
extracting nonceCHa , and the keys are verified by checking
the MAC value. Master key KM is refreshed by RBS. RBS
sends random integer r to CH for the refreshment of KM;
CH generates new KM by applying hash function on r and
the old KM.
6 Results and analysis
In this section, the proposed cluster-based WBAN tech-
nique is analyzed with respect to security, storage, and
energy consumption of nodes. Both intra-WBAN and
inter-WBAN communications involve routing, in which
the nodes (CMs) transmit data to the CH, which relays
the information to the RBS and then to the MS. All exper-
iments were performed using MATLAB (Mathworks,
Natick, MA, USA). For key generation, the EKG data of
31 patients are taken from the MIT Physiobank database
[44]. Clustering is performed for ten rounds for both pro-
posed and LEACH-based schemes.The simulation area is
kept as 100 × 100 m for 60, 100, and 300 nodes.
6.1 Security analysis
In this subsection, the security analysis of the proposed
scheme is demonstrated based on (a) resilience against
routing attacks, and (b) personal server compromise.
6.1.1 Resilience against routing attacks
Routing attacks include spoofed, altered, or replayed rout-
ing information; selective forwarding; sinkhole attack;
Sybil attack; and wormhole attack etc. Detailed descrip-
tion of all these attacks can be found in [35]. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss how the proposed technique defends
against these attacks.
Sybil attack involves the attack in which a single node
appears with multiple identities. The communication
between two PSs in a WBAN is done through pairwise
keys. When PSi wishes to send data to PSj, MAC is
computed by using the shared pairwise key between PSi
and PSj. These pairwise keys are only known to PSi and
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PSj so no adversary can pretend to be PSi unless PSi is
compromised. Thus, Sybil attack can be prevented.
The proposed cluster-based routing in WBAN includes
two types of routing in inter-WBAN and intra-WBAN
communications i.e., intra-cluster routing, and inter-
cluster routing. For intra-cluster routing, all CMs send
data only to the CH. For inter-cluster routing, the data
packets are forwarded only through CH in the clus-
ter. Other nodes in the cluster do not participate in
routing. An adversary is not able to route in the pro-
posed routing structure, therefore, the proposed tech-
nique is well protected against wormhole and sinkhole
attacks. Also in intra-WBAN communication, the sink-
hole is prevented by applying MAC using the EKG-based
keys.
The routing information is distributed by the CH. Since
CH in the WBAN is a high-end device, has tamper-
resistant hardware, and is well protected against routing
attacks, it cannot be compromised by an adversary. A
CH appends keyed MAC to each routing control mes-
sage. Only the intended CM and CH know the key used
to generate MAC so the adversary is unable to inject false
information in the WBAN. Due to these factors, selec-
tive forwarding attacks cannot be launched on CH. To
defend the selective forwarding attack on PS in WBAN,
PacketID is used. Each PS is responsible to confirm that
its successor has successfully forwarded the packet by
overhearing the transmission.
6.1.2 Dieharder tests for randomness
In the proposed work, keys are generated for 25 differ-
ent subjects using the EKG data taken from MIT Phys-
iobank. The Dieharder [45] testing suite is applied on the
keys generated from the EKG data. Dieharder includes
tests from DIEHARD [46] battery of tests, Statistical Test
Suite developed by the National Institute for Standards
and Technology, and also new tests developed by the
Dieharder team.
For each statistical test, a set of P value is produced. The
P value is the probability of obtaining a test statistic larger
than the one observed if the sequence is random. Hence,
small values are interpreted as evidence that a sequence is
unlikely to be random. The decision rule in this case states
that ‘for a fixed significance value α, a sequence fails the
statistical test if it’s P value < α’. A sequence passes a sta-
tistical test whenever the P value ≥ α and fails otherwise.
Authors in [32] assume that a test is considered failed if it
outcomes a P value less than or equal to 0.0001 or greater
than or equal to 0.9999. It results in a 95% confidence
interval of P values between 0.0001 and 0.9999.
Table 3 shows the average P value of keys generated
from the PVs of 25 subjects and their respective assess-
ments. Similarly, Figure 5 shows the P values of the total
tests of the Dieharder suite. It is evident from Table 3 and
Figure 5 that none of the P values is violating the condi-
tion given in [47]. The average P value is far away from the
boundaries defined in [47] for all the tests.
The sts serial, rgb bitdist, and rgb minimum distance are
the set of tests. For the sts serial test, the value of N-tuple
is from 1 to 16 and produces the P value between 0.424347
and 0.674048. Similarly, rgb bitdist have the value of N-
tuple ranging from 1 to 12 and produces the P value
between 0.438929 and 0.647891. The generated keys pass
each and every test in the suite, which shows the degree of
its randomness.
6.1.3 Personal server compromise
The proposed technique for inter-WBAN communica-
tion shows a strong resilience against node capture. To
check the randomness of the generated keys in an inter-
WBAN communication, the ‘Birthday Paradox’ analysis
is performed, i.e., if r keys are selected at random, what
is the chance that no two keys will have the same value?
Let Pr be this chance. If keys are independently and uni-
formly distributed between 1 and m, then the probability
equation will be as follows [48,49]:
Pr = (m)rmr =
m!
mr(m − r)! ≈ e
−r2
(2m) (11)
The purpose of this analysis is to assess the repetition
of the keys. For 64-bit key length, there are 264 different
combinations of keys that can be generated. Applying the
formula of ‘Birthday Paradox’, the probability of repeating
a key is 0.5 in 28 attempts, which is a big number because
the inter-WBAN communications have lesser number of
nodes in the network. Hence, the probability of repeating
a key in the network is very small. The threshold of the
probability of repeating a key falls within the range of 1 to
0.99999. Figure 6 demonstrates the probability of repeti-
tion of keys. At the initial stage, the probability of keys to
be unique remains closer to one. After the initial stage, the
curve starts declining and then approaches to zero. In case
of PS compromise, the secret key KSK is used to authenti-
cate the sensor nodes and the communication is done by
deploying new PS in the cluster.
6.2 Storage overhead analysis
The proposed scheme supports a large number of nodes
with a small number of keys, i.e., a few key pairs can sup-
port secure communication for a very large network. In
other words, the proposed scheme reduces the number of
keys required for a secure communication, thereby affect-
ing the memory consumption of the sensor node. The
graph in Figure 7 is drawn on logarithmic scale, because
the number of nodes that can be supported increases
exponentially with respect to the number of keys used.
Figure 7 substantiates the exponential increase in the
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Table 3 Dieharder testing suite results for randomness of EKG generated keys
Test name N-tuple t Sample P sample Average P value of 25 keys Assessment
diehard_birthdays 0 100 100 0.58498 Passed
diehard_operm5 0 1,000,000 100 0.524797 Passed
diehard_rank_32 × 32 0 40,000 100 0.58725 Passed
diehard_rank_6 × 8 0 100,000 100 0.620069 Passed
diehard_bitstream 0 2,097,152 100 0.480387 Passed
diehard_opso 0 2,097,152 100 0.583141 Passed
diehard_oqso 0 2,097,152 100 0.534111 Passed
diehard_dna 0 2,097,152 100 0.512451 Passed
diehard_count_1s_str 0 256,000 100 0.60379 Passed
diehard_count_1s_byt 0 256,000 100 0.443534 Passed
diehard_parking_lot 0 12,000 100 0.493756 Passed
diehard_2dsphere 2 8,000 100 0.627908 Passed
diehard_3dsphere 3 4,000 100 0.605787 Passed
diehard_squeeze 0 100,000 100 0.600487 Passed
diehard_sums 0 100 100 0.141058 Passed
diehard_runs 0 100,000 100 0.603007 Passed
diehard_craps 0 200,000 100 0.683825 Passed
marsaglia_tsang_gcd 0 10,000,000 100 0.641335 Passed
sts_monobit 1 100,000 100 0.553621 Passed
sts_runs 2 100,000 100 0.593961 Passed
sts_serial 1 to 16 100,000 100 0.424347 to 0.674048 Passed
rgb_bitdist 1 to 12 100,000 100 0.438929 to 0.647891 Passed
rgb_minimum_distance 2 to 5 10,000 1000 0.326321 to 0.534724 Passed
rgb_permutations 2 100,000 100 0.561426 Passed
rgb_permutations 3 100,000 100 0.617997 Passed
rgb_permutations 4 100,000 100 0.621495 Passed
rgb_permutations 5 100,000 100 0.525111 Passed
rgb_lagged_sum 0 to 32 1,000,000 100 0.420681 to 0.737265 Passed
rgb_kstest_test 0 10,000 1000 0.484288 Passed
dab_bytedistrib 0 51,200,000 1 0.411422 Passed
dab_dct 256 50,000 1 0.5766 Passed
dab_filltree 32 15,000,000 1 0.532675 Passed
dab_filltree 32 15000000 1 0.512094 Passed
dab_filltree2 0 5,000,000 1 0.478207 Passed
dab_filltree2 1 5,000,000 1 0.539234 Passed
dab_monobit2 12 65,000,000 1 0.570357 Passed
number of supported nodes while using very limited num-
ber of keys. In Equation 12 ‘k’ is the total number of keys,
‘m’ represents the number of keys required to support a
particular number of nodes, and ‘n’ is the total number of
nodes supported.
n = (k + m)!k!m! (12)
6.3 Communication and computation complexity
In intra-WBAN communication each time a key is
refreshed, the whole process is repeated, i.e., the fea-
tures are extracted and quantized, and then the keys are
generated after the feature exchange process between the
communicating sensors. Also in intra-WBAN commu-
nication, the key establishment latency (join and leave
latency) occurs very rarely, as the node leaving and joining
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Figure 5 P values of EKG-generated keys for each test.
occurs only when the node failure happens, e.g., due
to power failure or malfunctioning. Hence, due to these
properties of intra-WBAN communication, its communi-
cation and computation costs are relatively minimal.
Due to the availability of powerful devices and high
resources, inter-WBAN communication resembles the
communication in WSNs. Therefore, we compare our
proposed inter-WBAN communication scheme with
LEAP+ [6], which is a lightweight extensible authen-
tication protocol for WSN security. In inter-WBAN
communication, the WBAN (node) joining and leav-
ing may occur very frequently, so the keys need to be
refreshed regularly thereby affecting the computation and
communication costs of the scheme. The computation
cost depends upon the total number of encryptions and
decryptions taking place in the key agreement process.
Figure 6 Probability of keys.
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Figure 7 Storage overhead analysis.
In a cluster-based key agreement scheme, the number
of decryptions is equal to the network size (N) because
every node has to decrypt the message. Also in cluster-
based schemes, CH encrypts the message once for all
its CMs. Thus, the total number of encryptions depends
upon the network size and can be at most N. So, for
a network of size N, the average number of symmet-
ric key operations a node performs during cluster key
generation and updating is (2S/N) [6], where S is the
sum of all encryptions and decryptions, while N is the
network size. So the computation complexity of the pro-
posed work is dependent upon the degree of connectivity
(d) and network size N and can be given as O(d2/N).
Table 4 shows that the computation and communica-
tion complexity of both the schemes are same, but the
number of messages sent by the proposed scheme are
less than that of the LEAP+, which reduces the compu-
tation as well as the communication costs of the pro-
tocol. This is because the communication cost is the
sum of all costs incurred during transmission and recep-
tion of the messages for the key agreement, key refresh-
ment, and node addition and revocation. In cluster-based
key agreement, the communication cost is dependent
Table 4 Communication and computation complexity
Protocol Number of message Computation Communication
exchanges cost cost
LEAP+ 15 O(d2/N) O(d2/N)
Proposed 9 O(d2/N) O(d2/N)
scheme
upon the degree of connectivity of the nodes, i.e., the
increase in the connectivity will increase the commu-
nication cost. The communication cost is the same as
the computation cost because every node has to send
and receive keys for cluster key revocations. However,
in case of communication cost, the number of mes-
sages transmitted will affect the total cost and the pro-
posed scheme sends lesser number of messages than
the LEAP+ scheme. This is because the message over-
head is a much bigger concern than the computation
overhead. It has been shown that the energy for comput-
ing one MAC is equivalent to transmitting only a single
byte [50]; as for every message received, the node will
have to calculate the MAC and will update its neighbor
table.
In the key refreshment phase, the CH refreshes the keys
by selecting a random ID of a key from the key pool
and sends this ID along with its own ID to all the mem-
bers in the cluster. The members locate the key against
the selected ID and apply one-way hash function to gen-
erate a new key. The key IDs will have 2 bytes size, so
transmitting two IDs will take 4 bytes for key refresh-
ment to take place, i.e., CH’s own ID and ID of the
PS. Transmitting 4 bytes will not affect the communica-
tion cost. Also, one-way hash function (HMAC-MD5) is
used for the key refreshment to take place securely. To
generate the hashes for ‘HELLO’ message, HMAC-MD5
takes 0.0003 msec/operation on a P4 machine [51]. The
generation of hashes for the IDs of the communicating
sensors will take less time and hence will consume fewer
resources.
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6.4 Energy consumption
The energy consumption in intra-WBAN communication
is calculated for both LEACH and the proposed scheme.
The energy is dependent on the distance between the
PS of a WBAN and the sensor nodes. As the distance
between PS and CHs increases, its energy consumption
also increases. The energy consumption is calculated by
using the following formula [31]:
Energy = data_packet∗(2∗e_elect+e_emp∗distance)
(13)
In Equation 13, data_packet represents the number of
packets transmitted during the cluster formation process,
e_elect represents the energy consumed in the electron-
ics, while e_emp is the energy consumption in amplifier.
LEACH divides the network into clusters and the opera-
tion in LEACH is divided into rounds. In the first round,
the CH is elected among the number of nodes. The
election of CH uses probabilistic approach. LEACH intro-
duces randomized rotation role of CH between member
nodes to balance the energy conservation among nodes.
WBANs are highly resource-constrained networks and
need energy-efficient and secure solutions for commu-
nication. Figure 8 shows the energy consumption com-
parison of the proposed scheme with LEACH-based
scheme [5] in WBAN communication. The proposed
scheme consumes lesser energy as compared to LEACH-
based scheme because it uses hop-by-hop communication
between CHs to reach the sink (PS in case of intra-WBAN
communication) while LEACH uses direct communica-
tion between CHs and the sink (long-distance commu-
nication). It is apparent from Figure 8 that when we
increase the number of nodes, the energy consumption
also increases. In case of the proposed work, the energy
consumption varies between 0.029 and 0.05 mJ, while in
case of LEACH-based scheme, the energy consumption is
above 0.1 mJ.
In cluster-based solutions, the energy consumption dur-
ing CH selection process affects the performance of the
overall system. The CH selection process must be opti-
mal and energy-efficient. Figure 9 shows the comparison
of energy consumption during the CH selection process
in each round, where the proposed scheme consumes
less energy than the LEACH-based scheme. The pro-
posed scheme outperforms LEACH based solution due
to the small-distance communication in the CH selec-
tion process. Figure 9 illustrates that the energy con-
sumption in CH selection process in the proposed work
varies between 0.04 and 0.07 mJ, while the LEACH-
based scheme consumes energy between 0.1 and 0.19
mJ in CH selection process. The energy consumption
of the LEACH-based scheme is very high as com-
pared to the proposed scheme in case of CH selection
process.
We define the lifetime of a network as the duration
of time until the first node failure occurs due to battery
depletion. In order to increase the productivity and usabil-
ity of the proposed system, the network lifetime must be
increased. The decrease in network lifetime will automat-
ically decrease the usability, which will eventually affect
Figure 8 Energy consumption analysis as the number of nodes increases.
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Figure 9 Energy consumption during CH selection process.
the productivity of the overall system. Figure 10 shows
the network lifetime comparison of the proposed and
LEACH-based schemes where the proposed scheme has a
greater lifetime than the LEACH-based scheme. The pro-
posed scheme has the ability to perform small-distance
communication (CH to CH forwarding to reach the sink
node) which consumes less energy and increases the net-
work lifetime. The energy consumption of the proposed
scheme fluctuates between 160 and 200 units, while that
of the LEACH-based scheme is between 145 and 170
units.
The survivability of the proposed scheme depends
upon the time it takes to reach the completely dead
network status, i.e., when no node remains alive. As
WBAN is a small-sized network, less number of nodes
can sustain the connectivity in the network. Figure 11
Figure 10 Effect of increasing number of nodes on network life time.
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Figure 11 Total time from death of 1st node to 100% nodes.
depicts the comparison of how much time the pro-
posed and LEACH-based schemes take when the first
node, 50% nodes, and 100% nodes die. The pro-
posed scheme has a greater time in each of the case
due to lesser energy consumption in each phase. The
increase in number of dead nodes results in a lesser-
connected or half-connected graph. Hence, the num-
ber of dead nodes affects the connectivity in the
network and eventually decreases the performance of the
system.
The cluster formation for short-range communication
like in WBANs will result in more clusters. As the com-
munication distance is decreased for a particular network
area like WBAN, the energy consumption in the commu-
nication process will also decrease. Figure 12 shows the
effects of increasing the number of nodes on the cluster
Figure 12 Effects of number of nodes on clusters.
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formation process. The proposed scheme on average per-
forms better than the LEACH-based scheme when we
increase the number of nodes. Due to randomdeployment
of nodes, sometimes the deployment is worse for a given
experiment. In the figure the performance of the proposed
scheme is less efficient than LEACH-based scheme when
the number of nodes reaches 50 as well as in the case of
bootstrapping. This is due to the random deployment of
nodes in the network.
The above figures and discussion clearly show that the
proposed scheme performs better than the LEACH-based
scheme in case of energy consumption, network lifetime,
and cluster formation.
7 Conclusions
WBANs play an important role in providing better health-
care services by using continuous and real-time moni-
toring of health information. Before using WBANs on
real test beds, one must address the essential security
and energy consumption requirements of WBANs as
these requirements increase the usability and usefulness
of WBANs. The technique presented in this paper uses
clustering in both types of communications, i.e., intra-
WBAN and inter-WBAN. In intra-WBAN communica-
tion, secure cluster formation is done by using PV-based
generated pairwise keys. Introducing secure cluster topol-
ogy formation to intra-WBAN communication makes the
communication energy-efficient and increases the net-
work lifetime. In intra-WBAN secure cluster formation,
we compare the proposed scheme with the LEACH-
based scheme presented in [5]. The results of our analysis
show that the proposed scheme produces better results in
terms of energy consumption, cluster formation, and net-
work lifetime. In inter-WBAN communication, the clus-
ter formation process is secured by using pre-deployed
keys. The analysis of our proposed inter-WBAN com-
munication scheme in terms of storage and energy effi-
ciency shows that the proposed scheme uses very small
number of keys per node, which reduces the storage
overhead. Also, the cluster formation process in inter-
WBAN communication brings energy efficiency to the
scheme.
The security analysis of the proposed intra-WBAN
communication scheme shows resilience against different
attacks e.g., sinkhole attacks are prevented by using the
PV-based generated keys. In addition, replay attacks are
prevented by using nonce and time stamps. Similarly, in
inter-WBAN communication scheme, the generated keys
are random and the probability of repetition of the keys
is minimum. The proposed scheme is lightweight and is
highly suitable for WBAN applications.
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